Signal Temporal Logic-Based Attack Detection in DC Microgrids
Emerging converter-dominated dc microgrids employ distributed cooperative control strategies and communication network. Since there is no central entity to monitor and assess the global cyber scenario, microgrids employing distributed control are prone to cyber attacks. This work presents signal temporal logic (STL) detection of two major types of cyber attacks, namely false-data injection attacks and denial-of-service attacks. Such cyber attacks can compromise voltage regulation and load sharing in dc microgrids. STL is a formalism to monitor the output voltages and currents of dc microgrids against the defined specifications, such as operational bounds, over time. Besides detection, the proposed approach also quantifies the attack impact. Moreover, it can be effectively employed for a complex dc microgrid without prior knowledge of its dynamics. This detection technique is successfully demonstrated using a physical microgrid setup or in a hardware-in-the-loop environment, where various attacks are formalized, detected, and quantified.
O. A. Beg, L. V. Nguyen, T. T. Johnson and A. Davoudi, "Signal Temporal Logic-Based Attack Detection in DC Microgrids," in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 3585-3595, July 2019, doi: 10.1109/TSG.2018.2832544.